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Introduction 
Major international sporting events such as the World Cup and the Olympics generate 
billions of dollars in revenue and carry price tags for hosting of at least a similar amount. Of 
course, as with any business venture where billions of dollars are on the line, the potential for 
corruption is very real, and history is full of examples of both proven and alleged acts of 
corruption in the process of bidding for mega-events and well as during the construction and 
preparation stages. Due to their international prominence and the number of well-publicized 
scandals in recent years, this chapter focuses primarily on the Olympic Games and the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup; however, the lessons 
learned in examining these tournaments can be applied to other smaller-scale events.  
Corruption has been a part of mega-events since the very earliest days of these 
competitions. The modern Olympic Games take their name from the most of famous of the 
ancient Greek athletic competitions and were first played in 776 BCE. Indeed, the mythological 
origin of the ancient Olympics itself is deeply mired in a tale of deceit and corruption. Pelops, 
son of King Tantalus of Lydia, sought to win the hand of Hippodamia, the daughter of King 
Oenomaus of Pisa. The king required all suitors to beat him in a chariot race and had killed each 
of his daughter’s previous eighteen admirers during the race. In an act that makes modern 
accusations of bribing judges or the use of performance-enhancing drugs seem somewhat tame 
by comparison, Pelops won the race by sabotaging the king’s chariot, replacing the bronze axle 
with one made of beeswax, killing the king, and thereby winning both the hand of Hippodamia 
as well as the throne of Pisa. 
After his victory, Pelops organized funeral games at Olympia in order to thank the gods 
and honor Oenomaus. It is from these competitions that the ancient Olympic Games were 
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inspired. Furthermore, in order to dispel the notion that he had competed in the race for personal 
gain, Pelops turned down the traditional prize of gold. Instead, he accepted a crown made of 
olive branches, beginning the tradition of amateurism in the Olympics. The ancient Olympics 
awarded olive wreaths to winning athletes to symbolize what were supposed to be the pure 
motives of the competitors (Leeds, Matheson, and von Allmen, 2018).  
Of course, just as the issue of amateurism was a constant source of concern in the modern 
Olympics until the full acceptance of professional athletes in the early 1990s, so too were ancient 
Olympic athletes amateurs in name only. As early at 600 BCE, winners from Athens were 
awarded 500 drachmai, equivalent to two years in wages of the typical artisan (Gow, 1898). By 
the 5th century BCE, top competitors could support themselves entirely through athletics 
(Perrotet, 2004, pg. 53). Following the Roman takeover of Greece in 146 BCE, the Olympics 
became fully professionalized. Of course, no economist would state that paying athletes for their 
services amounts to corruption. However, paying athletes for their performances while 
simultaneously extolling the virtues of amateurism is unseemly at best, and compensating 
athletes for their talents when such payments are plainly against the rules, is clearly naked 
corruption.1 All in all, it is obvious that corruption in sports is not solely a modern phenomenon.  
The ancient Greek Olympics were disbanded in 393 CE when the Christian Emperor 
Theodosius, banned all pagan celebrations throughout the Roman Empire. Frenchman Pierre de 
Coubertin revived the Games in 1896, adopting the Olympic name and the amateurism ideals. 
The Summer Games have been held every four years ever since except in certain years due to 
World Wars. A winter version of the tournament was added in 1924. The International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) selects a host city from a large number of bidders roughly seven years in the 
                                                
1 The term “naked corruption” is apt when discussing the ancient Olympics as athletes in ancient Greece competed 
while nude.  
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advance of the event, and typically the location had rotated among large wealthy Western cities 
in Europe, North America, and Australia. As noted by Baade and Matheson (2016), more 
recently an increasing number of bids have come from developing nations with Beijing being 
selected as host of the Summer Games in 2008 followed by Rio in 2016. Beijing will host the 
Winter Games in 2022. 
FIFA was formed a few years after the IOC in 1904 in an attempt to organize the various 
national football associations in Europe and later Latin America. Disagreements with the IOC 
about the use of professional athletes led to the creation of the World Cup, first held in Uruguay 
in 1930. Like with the Olympics Games, the World Cup is held every 4 years and has 
traditionally rotated between Europe and Latin America, the two major historical centers of 
football prowess. Like with the IOC, the FIFA World Cup began expanding its geographical 
footprint in the 1994 when the United States held the event for the first time. South Korea and 
Japan and South Africa quickly followed suit. The event returned to South America in 2014 for 
the first time in nearly four decades when Brazil hosted the tournament. Russia will host in 2018 
followed by, quite controversially, Qatar in 2022.  
 
Corruption in bidding for mega-events 
            Hosting a mega-event like the Olympics or the World Cup brings a variety of perceived 
benefits to a country, both tangible and intangible. Boosters of such events promise that they will 
prove to be an economic windfall, especially in the tourism and construction industries. These 
benefits turn out to be very difficult to measure ex post, much less predict in advance (Matheson, 
2006), but they can still create an allure around hosting a mega-event. 
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A successful mega-event can also promote a country’s reputation on the world stage, and 
instill patriotism and civic pride at home (Malfas et al. 2004). Of course, poorly run events will 
have the opposite effect, and disorganization or corruption may lead a country to regret hosting a 
mega-event. Nevertheless, it is easy to romanticize the Olympics or the World Cup, so national 
governments are often eager to host them. 
When the bidding system is operating smoothly, these enticements cause a country to 
submit a bid and try to earnestly convince the selection committee of their country’s merit. 
Sometimes, the prize for hosting seems too great for the process to be left up to chance, and a 
government who wishes to host will conspire to unlawfully influence the selection committee. 
This influence may transparently be a quid pro quo bribe where money is offered in exchange for 
a vote on where the event should be held, or it could be more discrete. The payment is often 
structured as a donation to the sports program that is run by a member of a selection committee, 
sometimes with an assumption that the committee member will be able to steal the money for 
personal gain along the way. 
The World Cup has been plagued by scandals surrounding the selection of a host city in 
the past two decades. In 2010, FIFA simultaneously chose sites for the 2018 and 2022 World 
Cups, and the validity of this vote has been questioned ever since. No evidence of direct cash-
for-votes schemes was ever found; however, journalists at the Sunday Times disguised as soccer 
officials were able to convince members of the selection committee to accept bribes in return for 
voting for England for the 2018 host, which raised questions of integrity in the voting system. In 
addition, the Qatari government gave gifts to members of the Executive Committee, although 
there is no evidence that it was part of an explicit quid pro quo. 
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The bidding process for the 2002 Summer Olympics in Salt Lake City also featured a 
wide array of inappropriate gifts. Ten members of the International Olympics Committee 
resigned after ethics investigations, and the two leaders of the Salt Lake City’s bid committee 
were eventually indicted (but acquitted) on felony bribery charges (Hemphill, 2003).  
  
Corruption in World Cup Bidding 
A ‘pay to win’ mentality was established in inaugural World Cup in 1930 and would 
continue in subsequent competitions. Uruguay won the right to host the 1930 tournament by 
agreeing to fully pay for the travel costs of all of the participating teams, and to build a grand 
new stadium, the Estadio Centenario, for the event. In a case of somewhat ominous 
foreshadowing, the Estadio Centenario was not completed in time for the start of the tournament 
so that the first round of games had to be played at an alternative site (Molinaro, 2009). Of 
course, offering to host the most lavish tournament is not illegal, nor is it even necessarily 
unethical, but it highlights the notion that countries with deep enough pockets willing pay the 
price to host the event will get favorable treatment from FIFA or the IOC. To the extent that 
these events benefit some local sectors in the economy, such as the sports, hospitality, and heavy 
construction industries, at the expense of others, these events can serve as a massive wealth 
redistribution scheme which can be promoted through either legal or illegal methods.  
World Cup bidding scandals began to emerge in the late 1990s and well into this 
millennium. Allegations of past bribery were made public in 2015 when the Chuck Blazer, who 
died in 2017, admitted to facilitating a bribe relating to the 1998 World Cup. FIFA executive 
Jack Warner was the recipient of the bribe from Morocco, whose organizing committee hoped to 
secure the hosting privileges. This was the first of multiple instances of bribery that were alleged 
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against members of FIFA by Blazer, who had become an informant for the FBI regarding the 
matter (Gibson and Lewis, 2015). 
         Blazer revealed that there was a larger scheme years later in the selection of the 2010 host 
of the Cup. According to US prosecutors, a payment of $10 million was taken from the South 
African organizing committee and deposited into a bank account linked to Jack Warner in 
exchange for votes. In addition to criminal charges filed by the FBI regarding the matter, FIFA 
has filed a restitution request citing this case of bribery as well as that of 1998 (Gibson and 
Lewis 2015; FIFA 2016). 
 Similar allegations were made with regards to the 2006 World Cup in Germany by the 
weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. In an investigation undertaken by the magazine, evidence of 
a slush fund emerged. The purpose of this fund was allegedly to secure votes required to win the 
hosting privileges for the Cup. Der Spiegel suggests that the former CEO of Adidas, Robert 
Louis-Dreyfus gave the funds to the German organizing committee in order to facilitate the bribe 
(Spiegel Online, 2015). 
This section will focus primarily on the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, because the scandals 
in the bidding process have captured the public attention more so than other recent scandals. 
Much of what we know comes from the “Report on the Inquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World 
Cup Bidding Process,” written by Michael J. Garcia and Cornel Borbély (2017). They were 
respectively the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of FIFA’s Investigatory Chamber, which is an 
independent branch of FIFA responsible for oversight.  
The report, colloquially known as the Garcia Report, was commissioned in June 2012, 
and submitted to FIFA officials in November 2014. Initially, FIFA released only a summary of 
the Garcia Report, and claimed the report had found that the voting process had not been 
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corrupted. Garcia himself disagreed and pleaded for the full report to be published, and stated 
that his team had uncovered “serious and wide-ranging issues” (Keh, 2017), but FIFA refused to 
publish the report. On June 26, 2017, the German newspaper Bild announced that they had the 
full report and intended to publish it; FIFA experienced a nearly instantaneous change of heart, 
and released the full text the following day. FIFA stated, “For the sake of transparency, FIFA 
welcomes the news that this report has now been finally published,” without mentioning that 
they were the organization preventing its publication or acknowledging Bild’s role (FIFA, 2017). 
The first significant moment in the bidding process occurred in December 2008 when 
FIFA’s leadership announced they would simultaneously choose the sites for the 2018 and 2022 
World Cups. The motivation was financial: the financial crisis of 2008 was underway, and the  
Secretary General of FIFA, Jérôme Valcke, said that he feared that sponsors of the WC would 
“use the current situation [financial crisis] in order to argue that it’s not very clear or it’s not 
clear enough where the World Cups would be played” and would “try to reduce the current price 
they were paying to FIFA” (Garcia and Borbély, 2017, p. 25). 
The 2018 location was chosen by the votes of the Executive Committee in December 
2010, and then the 2022 location was chosen immediately after. There were supposed to be 24 
voting members, but two had been removed because they had been willing to accept bribes by 
the aforementioned undercover journalists at the Sunday Times of London. The countries (or 
pairs of countries) that would submit bids were Belgium/Holland (2018), England (2018), Russia 
(2018), Spain/Portugal (2018), US (2022), Australia (2022), Japan (2022), Korea (2022), Qatar 
(2022). FIFA had previously committed to holding the 2018 World Cup in Europe, and this 
splitting of the field between 2018 and 2022 inadvertently created an environment conducive to 
illegal vote-swapping, where a European country could coordinate with a non-European country. 
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A number of newspaper articles reported that Spain/Portugal promised to support Qatar for the 
2022 World Cup in exchange for Qatar supporting Spain/Portugal for 2018, but the Garcia 
Report states that no conclusive evidence has been presented that this collusion occurred. The 
Japanese bid team, apparently unaware that trading votes is expressly against FIFA rules, filed a 
report with the Investigatory Commission that they “examined the possibility to barter with host 
country candidates of 2018 for votes” (Garcia and Borbély 2017, p. 326), but had not followed 
through. 
The clearest evidence that members of Executive Committee were open to selling their 
votes was provided by journalists at the Sunday Times (2010). They published extensive 
reporting with a wide range of soccer officials stating that bribes were commonplace, and then 
went one step further by posing as businesspeople and offering bribes to two Committee 
members, Amos Adamu and Reynald Temarii. According to the Times, both men agreed. FIFA 
agreed that the evidence was damning, and Adamu and Temarii were subsequently stripped of 
their voting rights on the Executive Committee (although Temarii has disputed the allegations). 
There is evidence that Qatar, which was eventually chosen as the site of the 2022 World 
Cup provided gifts that were against FIFA rules. The Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani, met with at least three members of the Executive Committee in January 2010 in Brazil. 
Andreas Bleicher, who served as a consultant on the Qatar bid team, said, “[P]eople say in Qatar 
when His Highness travels, everybody he will meet will get a gift,” and added that it is typically 
“a nice gift” (Garcia and Borbély 2017, p. 165). The Executive Committee members are not 
allowed to receive “gifts and other benefits that exceed the average relative value of local 
customs” or any cash (FIFA, 2009, pg. 8). These gifts were almost certainly against FIFA rules, 
but they do stop short of the outright selling of votes.  
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 If these gifts were not part of a quid pro quo, should the public be concerned about them? 
After all, gifts are only problematic to the degree that they influence the ultimate decision about 
where to hold the games. There are three reasons that they may in fact have been used to 
influence the members of the Executive Committee. The first, and most pedestrian reason is that 
they may have in fact been part of an explicit exchange of gifts for votes, and this evidence was 
not uncovered. The second reason is that Committee members may preside over multiple World 
Cups over the course of their careers. Even in the absence of an explicit agreement, there is an 
incentive for an unscrupulous Committee member to establish a reputation as voting for 
whichever country gives him or her the best “gifts.” Finally, there is a natural human tendency to 
repay kindness with kindness even when there is no tangible benefit to reciprocation (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). This “golden rule” is laudable in most avenues of life, but gift-givers can rely on 
the tendency to reciprocate to distort the location of a mega-event.  
Qatari citizen Mohamed Bin Hammam played an unusual role in the Qatari bid as well. 
For most countries submitting a bid with a representative on the Executive Committee, that 
person acted as the head of the bid team and its strongest cheerleader. Bin Hammam was on the 
Executive Committee, but his feelings of his home country’s candidacy were ambivalent. He 
initially recommended against Qatar, before eventually supporting the bid. 
Bin Himmam also made a large number of improper payments in the $10,000 to $50,000 
to various officials associated with Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF), a branch of 
FIFA. In addition, he paid $1.2 million to FIFA Vice President and Executive Committee 
member Jack Warner (Garcia and Borbély, 2017), and these payments were reported in 
contemporaneous newspaper articles as proof that Qatar had paid to win the bid. Garcia and 
Borbély present convincing evidence that these newspaper articles were mistaken, and that Bin 
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Hammam was in fact paying bribes to win the position of FIFA president. Hardly a shining 
moment for the integrity of FIFA, but it is probably preferable to evidence that Qatar did pay for 
World Cup votes. 
Corruption in Olympics Bidding 
Suspicion also followed the selection of Nagano for the 1998 Winter Olympics. In the 
midst of the selection process, a large donation was made by Nagano’s local organizing 
committee in order to help build a museum for the Olympic Games. Following the securing of 
hosting rights, the organizing committee burned all documentation regarding the bidding (Jordan 
and Sullivan, 1999). This suspicious behavior that went relatively unquestioned led to attempts at 
the more scandalous behavior to come in the selection of the 2002 Winter Olympics location of 
Salt Lake City. 
The finalist cities for the 2002 Winter Games were Salt Lake City, Utah, United States; 
Sion, Switzerland; Östersund, Sweden; and Quebec City, Canada. On June 16, 1995, Salt Lake 
City won handily on the first ballot of voting, with 54 votes compared to a total of 35 votes for 
the other three cities combined. It was an auspicious start to a selection process that would 
become blanketed in scandal, eventually leading to the resignation of 10 members of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the indictment of the two leaders of the Salt Lake 
City bid team on bribery charges. 
The first allegations of corruption surfaced over three years after the selection of Salt 
Lake City as the host of the games. On November 24, 1998, the KTVX television station of Salt 
Lake City reported on the existence of a letter showing that the Salt Lake Organizing Committee 
(SLOC) was paying for Sonia Essomba to attend American University in Washington, D.C. Why 
was the Salt Lake City bid committee paying for someone’s tuition? SLOC chair Bob Garff 
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described the payments as an innocent “humanitarian effort,” a claim that was deeply undercut 
by the fact that Sonia Essomba’s father was René Essomba, a member of the IOC who voted on 
the site for the 2002 Winter Games (Associated Press, 1999). In a fitting twist, the letter itself 
appears to have been a forgery (IOC, 1999), but the underlying accusation was correct (Mallon, 
2000). 
IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch asked that the IOC Juridical Commission 
investigate the tuition payments made on behalf of the Essomba family. Upon the 
recommendation of the IOC’s Juridical Commission, Samaranch set up an independent 
commission to investigate any improper conduct by members of the committee. The 
commission, commonly called the Pound Commission after its chair, Richard Pound, found a 
wide range of behavior by IOC members that violated IOC rules and eroded public trust in the 
bidding process. 
For example, SLOC paid for over $17,000 in medical treatments for family members at 
Intermountain Healthcare in Salt Lake City (IOC, 1999). Payments often took this form, with 
Salt Lake City officials paying for services rather than paying cash directly to IOC members. 
Perhaps this was to establish an alternate motivation if the payments were discovered -- paying 
for someone’s college tuition or hospital bills seems more noble than handing over a cartoonish 
bag of money. Indeed, it turned out that Sonia Essomba was far from the only family member of 
an IOC member whose tuition was being paid by SLOC. There were a total of 13 people who 
had received “scholarships,” from the SLOC, with a total value of nearly $400,000. At least six 
of these recipients were revealed to be close family members of IOC members (Mallon, 2000). 
Some IOC members were paid in cash for typically smaller amounts than the large sums 
spent on education. SLOC employed consultants, whose responsibilities included orchestrating 
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meetings with IOC members, and sometimes passing along payments. One payment of $7,000 
was made through a consultant to the fictitious Zema Gadir, allegedly the daughter of Sudanese 
IOC Member Zein El-Abdin Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Gadir. Gadir later admitted that he had 
received the payments himself and that he had no daughter, with Zema being formed from his 
own initials. 
 
Corruption in the Organization of a Mega-event 
After a country wins the right to host a major sporting event such as the Olympics or 
World Cup, large-scale construction projects begin in order to make the hosting feasible. New 
stadiums are built and existing ones are restructured in order to hold each event. New 
infrastructure is often built as well. Roads and public transit may be upgraded for the 
encroaching influx of spectators and athletes. 
A large mega-event can often serve as a trigger for the construction of additional 
tangentially related public structures. These may include commercial centers, common areas, or 
other projects that may enhance the physical appearance of the host city or nation. This 
governmental mission creep has historically led to cost overrun in the hosting of such events. 
Every Olympics between 1968 and 2012 wound up with final costs exceeding original estimates 
with the median Games running 150 percent over budget. Montreal in 1976 and Sarajevo in 1984 
were the worst offenders with final costs ending up more than ten times the initial estimates 
(Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2012). 
Failure to meet budgetary estimates suggests significant economic difficulties in 
organizing these events, but does not necessarily imply that corruption is a primary driver of the 
problem. For example, the 2012 London organizers won the bid with a budget estimate of £2.4 
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billion, but this figure was revised upwards two years later to £9.3 as local officials began to 
include major urban renewal projects into the planning for the Games (Baade and Matheson, 
2016).2   
However, recent allegations and investigations in several host countries of mega-events 
suggest that simple cost overrun may not be the only problem of concern. In fact, it may be a 
symptom of a more serious issue. These large funding opportunities for contractors have resulted 
in the potential for illicit collusion, negligence, and unnecessary costs both before and after the 
games are hosted. The following sections will examine such costs and behavior as they appear in 
each part of the local organizational process. 
Corruption in the Awarding of Contracts 
Before preparations can begin, companies must compete to win the construction contracts 
being awarded by the host government for the various projects in preparation for the event. A 
competition between firms such as this incentivizes each to offer the highest quality at the lowest 
cost, which allows the host to pay as little as possible for the contract. 
Despite the theoretical prowess of this system, it encounters errors when conflicts of 
interest and illicit actions are introduced. Politicians and local organizers willing to accept bribes 
and befriend businessmen allow the potential for self-interested action, rather than action in the 
best interest of the host country. 
In 2014, The Anti-Corruption Foundation, a Russian non-profit organization, released a 
report which listed personal relationships between Sochi Olympics construction contract 
recipients and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. He is said to be friends with the two recipients of 
                                                
2 Somewhat laughably, when the final bill came to only £8.77 billion, the organizers claimed the event came in 
under budget despite costing 265 percent more than initially advertised.  
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the largest contracts, Vladimir Yakunin and Arkadiy Rotenberg. Yakunin is the former head of 
Russian Railways, the company which received about $10 billion in contracts for the Sochi 
Olympics (Anti-Corruption Foundation, 2014).  
It has since been revealed that this company has a history that would put this funding in 
jeopardy. According to an investigation by the broadcasting organization Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian Railways is guilty of suspicious actions in the process of hiring 
subcontractors. Investigators found evidence of contracts being awarded without a bidding 
process or authorization, often for inflated prices (Khazov-Cassia, 2016). The cost of these 
contracts is then the responsibility of the Russian treasury, as Russian Railways is a state-owned 
company. 
Putin’s second friend and former Judo sparring partner, Arkadiy Rotenberg, has 
historically been a major recipient of funding from the Putin administration, according to the US 
treasury (Reuters, 2015). Rotenberg’s company, Stroygazmontazh, is one of the largest 
subcontractors hired by the state-owned natural gas company Gazprom in preparation for the 
games. 
Questions akin to those faced by Russia have been asked of Brazil in the hosting of both 
the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio. Since hosting the World Cup, 
investigations have been launched concerning six of the twelve stadiums used in the games. 
These stadiums are being investigated for financial irregularities and allegations of bribery. The 
chairman of Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction and chemical conglomerate, admitted that the 
Corinthians Arena was a “gift” in exchange for many contracts given to the company by the 
Brazilian government. The company’s former chief executive Marcelo Odebrecht confirmed 
these allegations in documents released in a plea deal. He stated that “there was a request from 
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[President Lula] to my father: Help Corinthians to have its private stadium.” In addition to this, 
Lula has been accused of taking R$15 million (≈ $4.8 million USD) in return for awarding 
lucrative contracts to Odebrecht (Chade, 2017). 
In the Summer Olympics held two years later financial irregularities emerged again. 
Federal prosecutor Leandro Mitidieri disclosed that an investigation was underway into 
criminality in the preparation for the Olympic Games in Rio. The police have already found 
documents mentioning R$1 million (≈ $320,000 USD) in bribes paid by Odebrecht for 
construction contracts (Brooks, 2016). 
In addition to the potential to gain from awarding contracts for construction or services 
associated with the execution of the event, organizers have been accused of taking bribes in 
exchange for marketing and television rights. Major allegations of this nature emerged after the 
publication of FOUL!: the Secret World of Fifa; Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals in 
2006. The book, written by reporter Andrew Jennings, became the first of many major 
investigations into the organizational corruption of FIFA.  Later that year, Jennings helped in the 
production of an episode of Panorama, a British investigative news show, on the same topic 
(Miller, 2015). Panorama’s investigation revealed that former employees of the defunct Swiss 
sports company International Sports and Leisure (ISL) claimed to have bribed FIFA in exchange 
for lucrative marketing contracts. These allegations were confirmed by company financial 
records, which were examined by liquidators after ISL had declared bankruptcy (Jennings, 
2006). 
After receiving the documentation that Jennings had discovered and retaining Chuck 
Blazer as an informant, the FBI carried out a formal investigation into the corruption within 
FIFA and its continental confederations CONCACAF AND CONMEBOL (Miller, 2015). In 
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May of 2015, the investigation was made public. A total of 41 entities were indicted with charges 
including wire fraud and money laundering. The FBI alleges that over $200 million in bribes and 
kickbacks was taken in exchange for marketing and media contracts concerning the World Cup 
as well as other international soccer tournaments (US Department of Justice, 2015a; 2015b). 
Following the first announcement of multiple indictments, Sepp Blatter stepped down as 
president of the FIFA executive committee (McLaughlin, 2015). Though he cited a need for a 
“complete overhaul” in ethics as the reason for leaving, Blatter was one of those who were 
implicated in the FBI’s press release concerning their investigation. His predecessor in the 
position of president has confirmed the allegations, saying that Blatter had full knowledge of the 
bribes that were taking places while he was working for FIFA as General Secretary (BBC, 2015; 
Owen, 2015). 
Questionable integrity could potentially continue in FIFA leadership. The president to 
follow Blatter has also been accused of having a history of bribery and corruption. According to 
the Panama Papers, a compilation of leaked documents from law firm Mossack Fonseca, the 
recently elected Gianni Infantino was involved in suspicious deals, including one with Traffic 
Sports Europe, a company whose USA branch, international branch, and former CEO have all 
plead guilty to the FBI’s charges of bribery in exchange for contracts (Gibson, 2016a). 
 
Corruption in Construction 
Once preparation has been completed, construction may begin. The contracted 
construction companies are given a deadline with little to no flexibility and must work with 
speed to be finished in time for the events. This can potentially lead to poor working conditions 
for laborers as firms attempt to increase productivity or decrease costs. This maltreatment of 
17 
laborers was revealed by a 2013 report published by Human Rights Watch. It described the 
conditions of those employed in the construction of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. Among 
their findings was the withholding of wages and personal identification documents to force 
employees to stay (Buchanan, 2013). These were issues, they argued, for which the Russian 
government was ultimately responsible. 
The hosting governments are not the only entities who have been accused of such 
negligence. In 2017, Human Rights Watch published another report examining the human rights 
abuses in the preparation of the 2018 World Cup to be held in Saint Petersburg. During this time, 
FIFA admitted that it had full knowledge of the poor working conditions present in Saint 
Petersburg but apparently did not intervene. The report stated that seventeen deaths had already 
occurred in the construction of the Russian stadiums (Buchanan, 2017; Conn, 2017).   
These allegations of abuse continue to arise with regards to the hosting of the World Cup. 
Amnesty International has accused Qatari contractors of human rights abuses including forced 
labor and withholding of payments in preparation for the 2022 World Cup (Amnesty 
International, 2016). FIFA commissioned a report on the potential abuses, which confirmed the 
allegations. The authors of the report urged FIFA to include human rights as a criterion in its bid 
process for finding host countries (Gibson, 2016b). 
According to the OECD, this maltreatment of laborers and poor working conditions could 
be explained by a contractor’s goal of recuperating the money used to bribe a local organizing 
committee in exchange for a contract. The OECD reports that contractors offering bribes will 
attempt to recuperate the money using substandard material for the building project and billing 
for work that was not performed along with other cost-cutting acts (OECD, 2016). In addition to 
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this being costly for the host government and laborers hired, it may also be hazardous, because 
the substandard building material has the potential to be structurally unsound. 
 
Corruption and Cost-Overrun in Long-Term Management of Stadiums 
In addition to high costs and corruption in the preparation for sports events, there is also a 
potential for large long-term costs from behavior both illicit and not. Buildings that no longer 
have a use become “white elephants.” These structures become burdensome to the hosting 
government, which must continue to pay upkeep. This cost inevitably results in increased 
government debt and higher taxes for citizens. 
The prosecutor Leandro Mitidieri, tasked with investigation the Rio 2016 Olympic 
Games, published a report which spoke of the structures built for the games. Mitidieri claims 
they were built with “no planning” (Associated Press, 2017). Many of these stadiums are no 
longer used. Some are boarded up and have fallen into disrepair. The upkeep of such facilities is 
now the Brazilian government’s responsibility, making the citizens ultimately responsible for 
paying the upkeep of these unused structures. 
While concerns are raised about the costs of disuse in Brazil, the costs of use carry more 
emphasis in London. Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, has launched a probe into rising costs 
associated with the conversion of the former London Olympic stadium to a football arena for 
West Ham United, a premier league football team from the area. West Ham have agreed to pay 
15 million for the building after the conversion, leaving the rest of the 323£ million (≈ $427 
million USD) largely a responsibility of the government and its taxpayers (Gibson, 2016c). 
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Prevention of Corruption 
Corruption, negligence, and cost overrun can potentially surface in many parts of the 
hosting process. This means that it is paramount to use a multi-faceted approach in the 
prevention of such action which can be applied to each step in the hosting process. In order to 
ensure the prevention of illicit behavior at each stage, the incentive to act out of self-interest 
must be decreased or the behavior must be prevented entirely. 
The potential for corruption begins with the host country selection process. Members of 
the head organizational committee (e.g. FIFA’s executive committee) act as principals for the 
interests of the committee and FIFA at large; however, in addition to the motivation to do what is 
in the interest of the organization, they also have the motivation to act in self-interest. Thus, if a 
local organizing committee or other entity offers a bribe on behalf of a given country, a 
principal-agent problem arises in which a member’s interests no longer align with those of the 
organization. This also appears in the awarding of marketing and TV broadcasting rights. 
The principal-agent problem continues in the awarding of contracts for construction and 
event services by the host country. Local organizing committees are tasked with awarding 
contracts and payments for which any one committee member has no direct responsibility. 
Instead, these costs are the responsibility of the local committee as an organization, the host 
government and, by extension, the taxpayers. 
The OECD suggests that two of the most effective ways to prevent corruption in public 
procurement are through sanctions and transparency (OECD, 2016). Since the awarding of 
contracts for TV rights and country selection have similar issues in the mismatch of interests, 
these measures can be effective in preventing corruption in those areas as well. In order to 
decrease the incentive for a given entity to offer a bribe in return for a contract or vote, sanctions 
20 
can be applied to that entity if ever found guilty of bribery. This would increase the potential cost 
of an attempted bribe. If a firm were found guilty of bribery, the firm would be prevented from 
offering its services at subsequent events. Similarly, if a host country or person was found guilty 
of offering money for a vote, that country could be prevented from hosting and the person could 
be disallowed from participating in subsequent local organizing committees. 
Contrasting with the emphasis on preventing contractors and hosts from offering bribes, 
transparency emphasizes the ability to monitor the actions of those who award the contracts and 
rights to host. The use of the internet in order to submit bids could help to decrease contact 
between parties, while allowing all data from each bid to be available for public scrutiny. 
During the construction process non-monetary issues may begin to arise with regard to 
human rights abuses. As previously discussed, this could potentially be a result of the large 
amount of pressure placed on contractors to finish before the event with little room for error or 
delay. As such, firms may decide to increase the number of hours worked by each employee or 
spend less on the amenities given to the employees, many of whom live on-site during the 
construction process. 
In order to prevent these behaviors, the international organizers of such events should 
increase the amount of time between the selection of a host country and the execution of the 
games to ensure that contracting firms are not incentivized to force employees to work more 
hours or in substandard conditions. Additionally, the right to host a given mega-event should be 
contingent on the completion of construction without allegations of human rights abuses. The 
potential for revocation of hosting rights should be used as an incentive for host countries to have 
continued oversight in the preparation for the event. 
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Since there is still the potential for unnecessary long-term costs after the event in question 
is complete, these costs must be given emphasis. Some white elephant buildings seem to be 
secondary effects of corruption during the contract awarding process, such as in Brazil; however, 
these costs can be incurred without illicit behavior taking place. Prevention of such costs will 
require additional emphasis on plans for the structures following the event in the decision-
making process. 
John Nauright (2015) proposes a more radical idea: choose a permanent location for the 
Summer Olympics and one for the Winter Olympics (presumably a similar approach would work 
for the World Cup and other mega-events). The largest benefit would be the savings on building 
new stadiums and infrastructure. An ancillary benefit would be that after the “permanent” 
country has been chosen one final time for a particular event, there would be no further 
corruption in the choosing of a host country. Construction for the first event held in the new 
permanent country would face the same problems as the typical event, but the construction costs 
for future events would be greatly diminished, as would the incentive to distort the process. It 
would be a great loss if every other country lost out on the excitement of the chance to host the 
Olympic Games or the World Cup, but sharply reducing corruption would help to restore some 
of the events’ lost magic.  
Effective reforms may take the shape of the more modest recommendations from the 
OECD and others or the more extreme change of having a permanent city for each mega-event. 
What is clear is that mega-events would benefit greatly from successfully controlling corruption 
at every stage in the process. 
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